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THE OPINIONS OF JUSTICE AND CHIEF JUSTICE
CHARLES ALVIN JONES
By LAURENCE H. ELDREDGE*

When the Honorable Charles Alvin Jones took his seat on the
Supreme Court of Pennsylvania, as the junior associate justice, on
January 2, 1945, I looked at him with particular interest because he
had already written good appellate court opinions during his five
years tenure as a Federal circuit judge. During the following
sixteen and one-half years he wrote hundreds of opinions for the
Supreme Court of Pennsylvania which are reported in fifty-five
volumes of the official reports, commencing with 351 Pennsylvania
State Reports and ending with volume 405. As they came down on
opinion days I received them promptly and studied every one of
them. In my capacity as State Reporter for the Supreme Court of
Pennsylvania I, personally, write the syllabus for every reported
decision. Writing a clear, accurate syllabus requires a thorough
knowledge of every opinion in the case because concurring and dissenting opinions frequently bring into sharper focus just what it is
that the majority has decided and the areas of agreement and disagreement. Since I became State Reporter in December, 1942 I
have reported the opinions of twenty-two members of the Court,
including six Chief Justices, and they fill seventy-nine volumes of
the official reports.
Soon after I started reporting the opinions of Justice Jones I
began to look forward to what he would say next, and as the years
rolled by my admiration and affection for him steadily grew. The
picture of a judge emerges from his opinions. As I studied this
judge's opinions, I said to myself:
"Charles Alvin Jones despises hypocrisy. He goes
straight to the jugular and tells you clearly what he is
deciding. He does not beat around the bush with a lot of
dictum which will come back to haunt him and his court
in the future. He knows that conciseness generally adds
to the clarity of an opinion; but he does not hesitate to
write a long opinion when the nature of the case requires
it. He likes to state a rule of law concisely in his own
phrasing and support it with the bare citation of pertinent
cases. When he does quote from another opinion he
keeps it short and to the point. He sees no need to clutter
up his opinion (and the Reports) with page after page of
repetitious quotations which are already in the Reports,
* B.S., 1924, Lafayette College; LL.B., 1927, University of Pennsylvania; Reporter of the Decisions of the Supreme Court of Pennsylvania
since December 1942; Former Chairman of the Board of Governors, Philadelphia Bar Association; Adviser and former Revising Reporter on Torts
for The American Law Institute.
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all saying the same thing about a well settled rule of law.
He knows that appellate Judges make and unmake law
but they must operate in much more restricted areas of
law-making than legislators. He knows that laws are the
working tools of Society, not ends in themselves but the
means to social ends; and that when community changes
become such that the tool no longer performs its original
function, it must be abandoned or reshaped by the court
which created it. He realizes that stability is important
but change inevitable and that regardless of seventeenth
century aphorisms there is little certainty in life or law
in the turbulent twentieth century. He respects the opinions of his predecessors who generally spoke wisely concerning the problem which then confronted them; but he
is not too much concerned with stare decisis in dealing
with crimes and torts because criminals and tortfeasors
rarely injure persons in reliance upon past court decisions.
He does his home work thoroughly before he writes an
opinion. The quality of his opinions is enriched not only
by a mind which is well stocked with an unusual amount
of knowledge of law and general literature but also by a
mind which has a superior balance wheel which enables
him to reach the right judgment, to forge the adequate tool
to meet the present problem. He strives mightily to find
the best answer. He is a human being and therefore not
perfect and he understands (as some judges do not) that
important fact. He is a liberal who can sometimes be conservative. He is generally tolerant but he is quite intolerant of intolerance itself. He is a statesman who lifts his
eyes from the immediate problem to survey the far horizon. He is a Chief Justice with whom the State Reporter
works happily and with a sense of complete devotion."
This is the picture of Justice and Chief Justice Charles Alvin
Jones which emerged as I worked on reporting his opinions. Only
a few of them can be discussed within the limits of this article.
But there is no doubt that Senior Judge John Biggs, Jr. correctly
prophesied to Chief Justice Maxey and the other justices a few
minutes after Mr. Justice Jones took his seat beside them: "You
will find him a willing, an able and a skillful servant of justice."'
FREE SPEECH AND CENSORSHIP

I shall begin with the last opinion Chief Justice Jones filed, on
July 26, 1961, just five days before his voluntary retirement because of increasingly defective eyesight. It was altogether fitting
that his swan song should deal not only with questions of federal
and state constitutional law, in which he was particularly skillful,
but also that it should deal with those great and frequently troublesome problems of the scope of free speech and free press, which
were ever dear to him. The case of William Goldman Theatres,
1. 351 Pa. xxv.
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Inc. v. Dana- involved appeals by the Commonwealth from decrees
of the Commonwealth Court holding that the Motion Picture Control Act of September 17, 1959, P.L. 902 3 was unconstitutional.
The appeals were argued before all seven justices on March 21, 1961
by Attorney General Anne X. Alpern and particularly distinguished counsel for the appellees. There were also briefs for amici
curiae. In a four to three decision with the Chief Justice writing
the opinion of the Court, the Supreme Court affirmed the decrees
and held that the statute violated the due process clause of the
fourteenth amendment and also Article I, sections six, seven and
nine of the Constitution of Pennsylvania concerning free speech,
free press, and the right to trial by jury. The Supreme Court of
the United States denied a petition for a writ of certiorari. On the
free speech, free press issue Chief Justice Jones said: "The members
of the Convention which drafted that Constitution [of 17901 were
undoubtedly fully cognizant of the vicissitudes and outright suppressions to which printing had theretofore been subjected in this
very Colony. Although the provision in Article I, §7, of the Pennsylvania Constitution, as above quoted, has never heretofore been
interpreted by this court in present context, it is clear enough
that what it was designed to do was to prohibit the imposition of
prior restraints upon the communication of thoughts and opinions,
leaving the utterer liable only for an abuse of the privilege. History supports this view."' 4 After analyzing the statute he concluded: "The Act is clearly invalid on its face. It is designed to
effect, in violation of Article I, §7, of the Pennsylvania Constitution, a pre-censorship of the exercise of the individual's right
freely to communicate thoughts and opinions. Section 3 of the
Act expressly restrains the initial showing of a film for 48 hours
after notice to the Board of its intended exhibition; and subsequent
showings are likewise subjected to previous restraint for the reason
that, if the motion picture is exhibited after the censors have disapproved of it, the exhibitor may be criminally punished upon
proof, not of showing a picture that is obscene or unsuitable for
children, but merely upon proof of showing a picture the exhibition of which had been priorly restrained by the administrative
action of the Board of Censors.
"And, concomitantly, the Act offends, additionally Article I,
§§6 and 9, of the Pennsylvania Constitution. Section 6 prescribes
that 'Trial by jury shall be as heretofore, and the right thereof
remain inviolate', while Section 9 provides that 'In all criminal
prosecutions the accused hath a right to . . . a speedy public trial
2. 405 Pa. 83, 173 A.2d 59 (1961).
3. 4 P.S. § 70.1 et. seq. This Act, in part, authorized the State Motion
Picture Control Board to disapprove as "obscene" a motion picture "if to
the average person applying contemporary community standards its dominant theme taken as a whole appeals to prurient interest," and made it a
criminal offense to exhibit a "disapproved" film.
4. 405 Pa. at 88, 173 A.2d at 61-62.
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by an impartial jury of the vicinage; . . .nor can he be deprived
of his life, liberty or property, unless by the judgment of his peers
or the law of the land.' No provisions in the Pennsylvania Constitution are more fundamental to the liberty of the individual. What
they ordain is that the individual is entitled to a public trial by
an impartial jury of the vicinage in every situation in which he
would have been entitled to such a trial at the time of the adoption
of our State Constitution of 1790 and ever since under our succeeding constitutions." 5
He reasoned: "Since one accused cannot constitutionally be
punished for the utterance of alleged obscene matter except upon a
finding by an impartial jury of the vicinage that the matter was in
fact obscene, such result cannot be achieved by the artful device of
granting to administrative officials the power to disapprove the utterance if they think it is obscene, prohibit the sale, lease, loan, exhibition or use of anything so disapproved and impose a criminal
penalty for a violation of their prohibition. Constitutionally protected rights are not to be so adroitly subverted."
Rejecting the Commonwealth's argument that "community" in
the "community standards" definition of "obscenity" should be
interpreted to mean "Commonwealth of Pennsylvania", Chief Justice Jones answered: "The contention is patently specious. A 'community' in relation to standards of morality is a regional, and not a
political, entity. Obviously the moral standards of the average resident of a metropolitan area are not the same as the moral standards of the average resident of a rural county.
"Even if there were a definitive contemporary standard of
morality applicable to the State as a whole, there is no guarantee
that the censors appointed under the Motion Picture Control Act
would be capable of ascertaining it. The only qualification for
membership on the Board of Censors is that the appointees be
'residents of Pennsylvania.' No minimum requirements of academic education or sociological training is necessary."7
FIRST OPINIONS-IMPORTANT LIBEL CASE
Justice Jones's first opinion day was March 19, 1945. He filed
five opinions of the Court,8 one dissenting opinion, 9 and joined,
together with Justice Drew, in a dissenting opinion of Justice Allen
M. Stearne.10 Four of the opinions of the Court resulted in af5. Id. at 92-93, 173 A.2d at 64.
6. Id. at 95, 173 A.2d at 65.
7. Id. at 97, 173 A.2d at 66.
8. Hamilton Estate, 351 Pa. 419, 41 A.2d 567; Morphy v. Shipley, 351
Pa. 425, 41 A.2d 671; Stiegelmann v. Ackman, 351 Pa. 592, 41 A.2d 679;
Block v. Mylish, 351 Pa. 611, 41 A.2d 731; Bausewine v. Norristown Herald,
Inc., 351 Pa. 634, 41 A.2d 736.
9. Devereux Foundation Inc. Zoning Case, 351 Pa. 478, 41 A.2d 744.
10. Harris Estate, 351 Pa. 368, 41 A.2d 715 (1945).
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firmances but on his first opinion day Justice Jones reversed the
late President Judge Harry S. McDevitt in Stiegelmann, the first
of numerous reversals of that particular judge by the Supreme
Court during Justice Jones's incumbency. The opinion in Bausewine states a number of important rules concerning some aspects
of the law of defamation, including the use of witnesses who read
the newspaper article to testify to what the article meant to them.
This practice, so well known in England in cases in which the defendant claims the words were not understood in a defamatory
sense, has not, in Pennsylvania, received the attention it deserves.
This opinion is an important one in this sticky part of tort law.
First Dissenting Opinion
Nobody joined in Justice Jones's dissenting opinion in Devereux. This first dissenting opinion is interesting from several angles.
The opinion of the Court was written by Justice Horace Stern who
was to become Chief Justice and be succeeded in that office by
Justice Jones. Both of these men were appellate judges of unusual
stature who would grace any court of final jurisdiction. As they
worked together on the Court in perfect harmony, each man had
profound admiration and respect for the other. Rarely have I
known two intellectuals who developed such a deep and beautiful
friendship. After Chief Justice Stern retired in 1956 and up until
the last illness of Chief Justice Jones, it was a familiar sight in
Philadelphia to see just the two of them lunching together at the
Colonnade Restaurant on Walnut Street and engaged in animated
conversation. The problem in Devereux challenged each of them.
Justice Stern said: "We are here called upon to deal with a type of
controversy in which two interests, each in itself legitimate and
wholly commendable, come into conflict merely by reason of the
proximity of their locations. The one interest is that of a school
devoted to the education of mentally deficient, weak and abnormal
children, and the other that of the inhabitants of a fine residential
suburban section who oppose the housing therein of the pupils of
such an institution."" The Devereux School purchased a residential property with fourteen acres of land (the Welsh property) in
Devon, Easttown Township, in 1939 and the following year a zoning
ordinance was adopted which placed the school in an "A Residence
District", which permitted educational use "but excluding ....
[a] place for accommodating.. . . persons mentally deficient, ...
except as provided in Article X". This article authorized special
exceptions and such variances "as will not be contrary to the public interest". In 1943 the school bought an additional nearby residence and 4 acres of land (the Ilsley property), intending to use it
as a dormitory. The zoning board of adjustment granted a variance for this use which they called an "exception." The Court of
11. 351 Pa. at 479-80, 41 A.2d at 744-745.

DICKINSON LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 71

Common Pleas of Chester County reversed the board, and the
Supreme Court affirmed the order.
In opening his first dissent Justice Jones said: "I am unable to
agree with the conclusions reached by the majority of the court in
this case. Because of the general public importance of the underlying principles involved,12 I deem it appropriate to state the reasons
for my differing views.'
He reasoned: "If the ordinance, here involved, is to be construed as denying to an owner the right to occupy a property for
an educational use or as a dormitory of an educational institution
on the ground that the pupils of the institution are mentally
'weak' or 'deficient', I think the criteria thus set are so vague, indefinite and uncertain as to admit of an arbitrary, capricious and
unreasonably discriminatory exercise of the police power in violation of both State and Federal Constitutions.
"The degree of mentality of the pupils of an educational institution alone cannot justifiably be made the basis for differentiating
between a permissive and an excluded use of property by such institutions. Sanity is a relative term at best. But, when you come
to mental weakness or deficiency, the shades of difference are so
varying and therefore so many, as to preclude either term from
19.
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tant to dissent. He believed that after the battle was fought out in the

secrecy of the conference room it was important, whenever possible, for
the Court to close ranks and present a united front. However, he did not
hesitate to dissent vigorously when he could not agree with the majority
and an important public issue was involved. Volume 351 contains 109 cases
decided in 1944-45. Including the Devereux dissent, there are dissenting
opinions in nine cases with a dissent noted in one other. I reported the
other ninety-nine (90.8%) as being unanimous. With respect to the 109
cases in 351 Pa., only ten not being unanimous, the summary on dissents is:
Justice Drew five, Chief Justice Maxey four, Justice Horace Stern three,
Justice Linn two, Justice Hughes two, Justice Jones two, Justice Patterson
one, and Justice Allen M. Stearne one.
Volume 405, the last volume containing opinions of Chief Justice Jones,
contains eighty-nine cases decided in 1961-62. There are nineteen dissenting opinions in eighteen cases and thirteen other dissents noted in eleven
additional cases. I reported sixty of the eighty-nine cases (67.4%) as being
unanimous. With respect to the eighty-nine cases in 405 Pa., with twentynine not being unanimous, the summary on dissents is: Justice Cohen
twelve, Justice and Chief Justice Bell eleven, Justice Musmanno six, Justice Benjamin R. Jones four, Justice Eagen three, Justice Bok two, Chief
Justice Jones zero, Justice Alpern zero.
As this is written, Volume 422 Pa. is the latest completed volume and
it contains eighty-seven cases. The unanimous Court completely supported
the decision in forty-four cases (50.5%) and in eight others one or more
justices noted concurrence "in result" only, making a total of fifty-two
cases (59.8%) in which there Was no dissent. There were one or more
dissenting opinions or dissents noted in the other thirty-five cases. The
summary on dissents is: Justice Cohen did not participate in twenty-one
cases and dissented in ten of the other sixty-six cases. The others are
Justice Musmanno fifteen, Justice Roberts nine, Chief Justice Bell eight,
Justice Eagen seven, Justice Jones 'six and. Justice O'Brien one. _
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being used as an arbitrary norm."1
The practicality of Justice Jones comes out in this language:
"The Welsh and Ilsley properties together form a single tract,
which is bounded on its four sides by public roads. The whole of
the property, thus enclosed by highways, is not traversed by any
road for public use. Devereux can build all over the Welsh property (three-quarters of its whole tract) without let or hindrance
from the zoning authorities, so long as the buildings are intended
and used for school or incidental dormitory purposes. In fact,
Devereux may even now, under the construction of the majority,
use the Ilsley property for school purposes. The only restriction
imposed is that it keep its dormitory facilities over the line on the
Welsh property.
"From a zoning aspect, how insignificant and unimportant becomes the fact that Devereux's pupils are broadly termed mentally
'weak' or 'deficient'! In the shadowy presence of that vague and
indefinite reason for excluding Devereux's use of the Ilsley home as
a dormitory, the hardship appears all the more 'unnecessary' when
Devereux has need of the dormitory for its boys and finds building
construction out of the question because of costs, not to mention
private building, of which a court may
war-time restrictions on 14
well take judicial notice."
IMMUNIrY OF FOREIGN SOVEREIGNS

Among the early cases F. W. Stone EngineeringCo. v. Petroleos
Mexicanos' 5 deals with constitutional law, sovereign immunity of
foreign powers, and the weight to be given to the State Department's opinion. Justice Jones states the issue in his first sentence:
"The question in this case is whether the State Department's recognition of the defendant corporation a a governmental instrumentality of the Republic of Mexico, with an attendant right to
sovereign immunity, required the court below to release property
of the defendant from the grasp of the court's process, viz., a writ
of foreign attachment issued by the plaintiff against funds of the
defendant on deposit in a local bank."1 ,
The Court held: "When the Department of State makes known
its determination with respect to political matters growing out of or
incidental to our Government's relations with a friendly foreign
state, it is the duty of the courts to abide by the status so indicated
or created and to refrain from making independent inquiries
into the merit of the State Department's determination or from
to the Governtaking any steps that might prove embarrassing
' 7
ment in the handling of its foreign relations."'
13.
14.
15.
16.
17.

351 Pa. at 488, 41 A.2d at 748.
Id. at 492, 41 A.2d at 750.
352 Pa. 12, 42 A.2d 57 (1945).
Id. at 13, 42 A.2d at 58.
Id. at 16,.42 A.2d at 59. The opinion added:

"It is irrelevant
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NOMINATIONS FOR SUPREME COURT JUSTICES

In 1950 the Supreme Court suffered a grievous blow when
three members of the Court died before the arrival of summer:
Justice Patterson on January 6, Chief Justice Maxey on March 20,
and Justice Linn on June 13. On March 7, the tenth Tuesday
preceding the primary election a single vacancy existed in the
Court and in accordance with the Pennsylvania Election Code the
Secretary of the Commonwealth notified the county boards that
the candidates to be nominated at the primary election included a
justice of the Supreme Court. The Honorable John C. Bell, Jr.
was appointed by Governor Duff to the Court on March 24, 1950
and he became the Republican nominee for election to a full term.
The Honorable Michael J. Eagen became the Democratic nominee
for a full term. At the general election in November these were
the only two names on the ballot as major party candidates for
election as a justice of the Supreme Court. Justice Bell received
the greater number of votes and was certified as having been
elected. In a mandamus action in the Commonwealth Court, Judge
Eagen asked the Court to order the Secretary of the Commonwealth
to certify that he was lawfully elected a justice of the Supreme
Court to fill the vacancy created by Chief Justice Maxey's death
on March 20. He pointed to the Constitution of Pennsylvania,
Article V, section 25 (which provides that "Any vacancy happening
by death .

. .

. in any court of record, shall be filled by appoint-

ment by the Governor, to continue till the first Monday of January next succeeding the first general election, which shall occur
three or more months after the happening of such vacancy") and
to Article V, section 16 (which provides "Whenever two judges of
here that the foreign instrumentality conducts a commercial enterprise
which, it was contemplated, would show a profit. Even if that had present
relevancy, the enterprise was for the development of the trade and commerce of the foreign government and to supply revenues for its treasury,appropriate concerns of that government:
cf. Berizzi Brothers Company
v. Steamship Pesaro, 271 U.S. 562, 574. Nor is it of any significance that
the governmental instrumentality is a separate corporation. A determination by the Secretary of State with respect to the status of such instrumentalities is as binding upon the courts of this country as is his determination with respect to a foreign government itself." Id. at 17, 42 A.2d
at 59-60. The language quoted in the text was recently quoted in Chemical Natural Resources v. Republic of Venezuela, 420 Pa. 134, 215 A.2d 864
(1966), in which the Stone Engineering case was said to be "pertinent and
controlling." In the Stone case Justice Jones approved the first paragraph
of my syllabus which commences "A court does not have jurisdiction," etc.,
which was based on his statement on page 14 "The sole question is whether
the court below had jurisdiction to entertain the attachment proceeding
.
This
.. syllabus statement can no longer be considered good law in
view of the express holding in the Venezuela case that the court did have
jurisdiction (in the strict sense) and the order quashing the appeal taken
pursuant to the Act of March 5, 1925, P.L. 23, § 3. The Supreme Court
held, however, that such jurisdiction should not be exercised, and by writ of
prohibition directed the court below to dismiss the action.
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the Supreme Court are to be chosen for the same term of service
each voter shall vote for one only, and when three are to be chosen
he shall vote for no more than two; candidates highest in vote
shall be declared elected."). Judge Eagen contended that under
the Constitution "two judges" had to be elected at the 1950 general
election and that since he received the second highest number of
votes he should be declared elected to the Court to fill the second
vacancy. The Commonwealth Court refused to issue a writ of man18
damus and a four judge Supreme Court unanimously affirmed.
Chief Justice Drew's opinion held, for three members of the Court,
that the constitutional provisions were not self-executing, that the
notice provisions of the Pennsylvania Election Code concerning the
procedure for nominations are mandatory, and that Judge Eagen
had not been elected. In a strongly worded concurring opinion
Justice Jones said: "I concur in the affirmance of the judgment
entered by the learned court below but am unable to subscribe to
the reasons given by the majority for this court's action. The constitutional question involved is of such transcendent importance,
touching, as it does, the matter of due election to vacancies in judicial office, that I am constrained to give my differing views even
if for no other service than the record.
"Material to the present question is the fact that three vacancies occurred in the membership of this court in 1950, the last on
June 10th, considerably more than three months before the next
succeeding general election which fell on November 7, 1950.
"Article V, Section 25, of our State Constitution provides that
'Any vacancy happening by death, resignation or otherwise, in
any court of record, shall be filled by appointment by the Governor, to continue till the first Monday of January next succeeding
the first general election, which shall occur three or more months
after the happening of such vacancy.'
"Article IV, Section 8, which empowers the Governor to fill by
appointment any vacancy that may happen in a judicial office,
inter alia, expressly provides that '. . . in any such case of vacancy . . . a person shall be chosen to said office on the next

election day appropriate to such office according to the provisions
of this Constitution, unless the vacancy shall happen within [three]
calendar months immediately preceding such election day, in which
case the election for said office shall be held on the second succeeding election day appropriate to such office.' " 19
He traced the history of Article V, section 25 and said the
clear intent was to fill at the next general election any judicial
vacancy which occurred more than three calendar months prior
to it. Justice Jones's closely reasoned opinion fills twelve pages in
the Report and should be read in its entirety. Here is part of it:
18.

Eagen v. Smith, 366 Pa. 501, 78 A.2d 801 (1951).

19. 366 Pa. at 508, 78 A.2d at 804.
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"It is my opinion, therefore, that, under the foregoing constitutional requirements, the three vacancies on this court occurring
in 1950 should have been filled at the general election on November 7th last and that the electoral machinery for making the requisite nominations was legally available. However, by the same token, I also think that the appellant's petition for mandamus did
not properly lie. The particular portion of the limited-voting provision of Article V, Section 16, of the Constitution, applicable when
two judges of the Supreme Court are to be elected for the same
term of service, was not operative. There were three, not two,
vacancies to be filled and, by the express terms of that constitutional direction, the voters would appropriately have had an opportunity to vote for not more than two; and that, as is well
known, was not the case.
"The majority's present holding is that the Election Code of
1937 had the effect of rendering ineffectual the specific constitutional provisions governing the filling of vacancies in the office of
judge of the Supreme Court except for the first of the three
vacancies (happening in 1950), notwithstanding that all three of
such vacancies occurred more than three months before the next
succeeding general election. The authority ascribed by the majority
for its decision is the ruling of this court in O'Neill v. White, 343
Pa. 96, 22 A.2d 25, which put a patently erroneous construction on
Article IV, Section 8, of the Constitution and elevated a mere statute above the fundamental law. That case held that 'The Constitutional provision invoked by appellees is unavailing in this case,
for this provision is not self-executing and its mandate cannot be
carried out because the legislature has not provided the means for
doing so' (In O'Neill v. White the office of Register of Wills was
involved).
"It is an utter irrelevancy to the inquiry to dispose summarily
of either Article IV, Section 8, or Article V, Section 25, by saying
that they are not self-executing. Once those constitutional mandates took effect under existing and concomitantly enacted law,
they thereby became operative and could not thereafter be nullified by the legislature whose sworn duty it is to respect and
effectuate the Constitution. Nor is any intent to abrogate the cited
constitutional provisions by means of the Election Code to be imputed to the legislature: Statutory Construction Act of May 28,
1937, P.L. 1019, Art. IV, Sec. 52, 46 PS §552."20
He concluded: "For my own part, I cannot accede to O'Neill v.
respect the
White as binding authority and, at the same time,
21
Constitution's mandates as I understand them to be."
There were two happy sequels to this case:
1. The Legislature amended the Pennsylvania Election Code
20.
21.

Id. at 510-11, 78 A.2d at 805.
Id. at 519, 78 A.2d at 809.
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to provide for the filling at the next general election of any judicial
vacancy which was created more than three months prior to the
election but too late for electing nominees
at the primary election,
22
which conformed to Justice Jones's views.

2. Judge Eagen was elected a justice in 1959 and took his seat

on the Supreme Court on January 4, 1960.23

CRIMINAL LAW AND THE CONSTITUTION

From the standpoint of its national effect, the opinion of Justice
Jones in Commonwealth v. Nelson 24 is probably his most important
opinion. Steve Nelson frankly admitted he was a Communist.
He was Chairman of the Communist Party of Western Pennsylvania. He was indicted and convicted in 1952 of an attempt to overthrow the Government of the United States by force and violence,
contrary to the Pennsylvania Sedition Act of 1919. There was no
evidence of any seditious act or even utterance against the Government of Pennsylvania. He was tried at a time when many people, and some judges, saw a Communist behind every bush and
shook with terror at the thought of one. Justice Jones said: "As
the defendant has, at all times, admitted his membership and position in the Communist Party, obviously his views are so extremely
unpopular with a vastly preponderant majority of the citizenry of
our Country as to amount virtually to an anathema in the public
mind. That very circumstance makes it especially incumbent upon
a court, in reviewing the conviction of such a person for an alleged
offense against the body politic, to scrutinize the record with utmost care to see that he received a trial that fully comports with
our concept of traditional due process-quite apart from any question of trial error in the admission or rejection of evidence or in
alleged excesses or deficiencies in the court's instructions to the
jury."

25

Brushing aside substantial complaints of prejudicial error in
the record, Justice Jones went straight to the controlling question:
Did the Federal Smith Act, which defines sedition against the
United States and prescribes punishments therefor, supersede the
Pennsylvania Sedition Act and bar any prosecution for violating
it? Justice Jones, speaking for four members of the Supreme
Court, held that it did. He said: "The question is obviously one of
22. Act of August 26, 1953, P.L. 1479, 25 P.S. § 2953.
23. Some measure of Justice Eagen's contribution to the Supreme
Court may be seen in the recent citation of his opinion in Hurtt v. Stirone,
416 Pa. 493 (1965) by the Right Honorable Lord Denning, Master of the
Rolls, in his opinion in Barclays Bank v. Cole [1967 2 W.L.R. 166]. American cases are rarely cited in the English Court of Appeals even when the
opinion writer is Holmes or Cardozo.
24. 377 Pa. 58, 104 A.2d 133 (1954). Justices Musmanno and Arnold
did not participate in the decision.
25. 377 Pa. at 62-63, 104 A.2d at 135-136.
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greatest importance. It not only revolves about a serious offense
allegedly committed against the Government of the United States
but it also calls for a consideration and understanding of the relationship between the Federal Government and the several States
and the limitations upon the actions of each in respect of the other.
As the question is basic to the appeal, our plain and immediate
duty, therefore, is to decide it in accordance with what we take to
be the applicable and controlling principles of law as declared by
the Supreme Court of the United States. Article VI of the Federal
Constitution provides that 'This Constitution, and the Laws of the
United States which shall be made in Pursuance thereof; and all
Treaties made, or which shall be made, under the Authority of the
United States, shall be the supreme Law of the Land; and the
Judges in every State shall be bound thereby, any Thing in the
Constitution or Laws of any State to the Contrary notwithstanding.' ,2
After analyzing the criteria for determining a question of supersession he said: "One of the categories of supersession is when the
field, in which both the Federal Government and the State have
legislated, is of paramount importance to the Federal Government.
What federal interest, it may be asked, could be more dominant
than maintenance of the security of the Federal Government itself
which the Smith Act was designed to vouchsafe against subversive
political assaults? And what could be more hampering to the
exercise of federal power in such connection than to have a State
assume to prosecute what is in truth an affront to the National
Government? We have already referred to the powers of the
Federal Government derived through state concession, either expressly or impliedly, upon the adoption of the Constitution. But,
wholly apart from that, the Federal Government has at all times
possessed the inherent right to protect and defend itself against
enemies domestic as well as foreign. The old saying that 'Self
preservation is the first law of nature' is as true of nations as it is
of animal life. When, therefore, a State asumes to punish, as
does the Pennsylvania statute here involved, sedition against the
United States, it is intruding in a matter where the national interest is obviously paramount. It follows necessarily that the Federal
Government's control of the field must be exclusive if it is to protect itself effectively and completely. And that means no sharing
of the jurisdiction with the States.
"The arrest of suspects by a State for indictment and trial on
charges of sedition against the United States under a local statute
could readily impair and even thwart the Federal Government's
contemporaneous investigation of the alleged offenders. Indictees
under the Pennsylvania statute, for example, might well be but a
part of a larger group spread over a number of States. The ap26.

Id. at 64, 104 A.2d at 136.
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propriate place for the indictment and trial of all such is best
determined and selected by the Federal Government, alone, with
Congress, in enacting
its national jurisdiction and policies. And,
27
the Smith Act, must have so recognized."
Justice Jones added this penetrating comment: "Unlike the
Smith Act, which can be administered only by federal officers acting in their official capacities, indictment for sedition under the
Pennsylvania statute can be initiated upon an information made
by a private individual. The opportunity thus present for the indulgence of personal spite and hatred or for furthering some selfish advantage or ambition need only be mentioned to be appreciated. Defense of the Nation by law, no less than by arms, should
be a public and not a private undertaking. It is important that
punitive sanctions for sedition against the United States be such as
have been promulgated by the central governmental authority and
administered under the supervision and review of that authority's
judiciary. If that be done, sedition will be detected and punished,
no less, wherever it may be found, and the right of the individual
criticism of the governto speak freely and without fear, even in
'28
ment, will at the same time be protected.
The Court reversed the judgment and quashed the indictment.
The thirty-two page dissenting opinion of the lone dissenter, included the text of a letter attacking the opinion of the Court written by Congressman Smith ten days after the opinion was filed,
and attached to the Attorney General's petition for reargument.
The language of this dissenting opinion was such as to bring forth
an unusual joint concurring opinion by all the other justices who
participated in the decision, which started off "We concur in the
foregoing opinion [of Justice Jones] in its entirety."29
Pennsylvania Attorney General Truscott petitioned the Supreme Court of the United States for a writ of certiorari which
was granted. The Supreme Court permitted numerous interventions. The Solicitor General of the United States and the Attorneys General of Massachusetts, New Hampshire and Texas, filed
briefs supporting Attorney General Truscott and urging the Supreme Court to reverse the Supreme Court of Pennsylvania. The
American Civil Liberties Union and a group of lawyers filed
separate briefs supporting the decision. The Attorney General of
New Hampshire was permitted to present oral argument. The
Solicitor General's brief stated that forty-two States have sedition
statutes, of one kind or another. Certainly every facet of the
question of supersession was thoroughly presented in the briefs
and oral arguments. In Commonwealth of Pennsylvania v. Steve
Nelson3 0 the Supreme Court of the United States in a six to
27.
28.
29.
30.

Id.
Id.
Id.
350
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at 74-75, 104 A.2d at 141.
at 76, 104 A.2d at 142.
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three decision, affirmed the order of the Supreme Court of Pennsylvania. Chief Justice Warren wrote the opinion of the Court
which expressed his views and those of Justices Frankfurter, Black,
Harlan, Clark and Douglas. Chief Justice Warren quoted with
express approval of its soundness, much of Justice Jones's language which I have quoted above. Predictions that affirmance
would result in national disaster did not materialize and proved to
be speculations from the tongues of false prophets.
When lawyers who practice in the criminal courts discuss Chief
Justice Jones the conversation is pretty certain to get around to his
opinions in Commonwealth v. Turner3' and Commonwealth v.
Redline. 2 "Treetop" Turner, as he was called, was a twenty-four
year old Negro with a fourth grade education in a North Carolina
school, who was arrested on June 3, 1946 and subsequently
charged with a brutal double murder which had been committed
the preceding December. After days of police questioning, which
the Supreme Court of the United States held to be coercive, he
signed a confession. Treetop was tried and convicted five times for
murder and sentenced to death four times. The fifth trial produced a sentence of life imprisonment. For a decade he lived in
the constant shadow of the electric chair. The opinion of Chief
Justice Jones on the appeal from the sentence of life imprisonment
is one of his finest pronouncements. It commences "The trials
of the appellant for murder for the same felonious homicide have
amounted to a near tragedy of errors and all because the prosecution was initially conceived and undertaken on confessions wrung
from the appellant and his co-defendants by coercive third-degree
police methods which served to render the confessions incompetent
as evidence." 3 He added: "As the confessions had constituted substantially the Commonwealth's entire case against the defendant at
his first trial and with their exclusion upon a retrial thus foreordained by the Supreme Court's ruling the Commonwealth was put
to it to introduce other evidence to support the indictment. The
fact is that the prosecution's subsequent efforts to meet the exigency of proof, thus occasioned, has been productive of reversible
error at
each succeeding retrial that has come before us for re34
view."
At the second and third trials Lofton, a confessed accomplice
who had pleaded guilty to the murders, was the principal witness
against Treetop, but at the fourth trial he refused to testify and
after the fourth death sentence was pronounced he signed a sworn
statement in which he admitted having perjured himself in all of
his previous testimony. "Nonetheless," said Chief Justice Jones,
"at the subsequent [5th] trial, the district attorney called Lofton as
31.
32.
33.
34.

389
391
389
Id.

Pa. 239, 133 A.2d 187 (1957).
Pa. 486, 137 A.2d 472 (1958).
Pa. at 242, 133 A.2d at 188.
at 244-45, 133 A.2d at 189.
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a witness for the Commonwealth and, as had been plainly forecast,
the witness steadfastly refused to testify as the district attorney
strove, by interminable and repetitious questioning, to get him to
do in line with his earlier testimony. For his refusal to answer the
district attorney's questions, the trial judge forthwith held Lofton
in contempt of court. The district attorney then argued that Lofton, by his refusal to testify, had rendered himself an unavailable
witness and that, therefore, his former testimony against the defendant should be read into the record, and moved the court for
leave to do so.
"It is, of course, too evident to admit of any doubt that the
district attorney well knew when he called Lofton as a Commonwealth witness at Turner's fifth trial that he would refuse to testify to the same effect as he formerly had." 35
Chief Justice Jones ruled that the trial judge had properly refused the motion to read Lofton's former testimony as that of "an
unavailable witness" but had erred in permitting the district attorney to plead "surprise" and cross-examine Lofton (and, under the
guise of cross-examination, to read Lofton's prior incriminating testimony). The Chief Justice said: "To accept the district attorney's
contention that Lofton's hostility and adverseness was evidenced by
his refusal to testify against Turner, as he had done at former
trials, would be to put the Commonwealth in the position of seeking
a victim regardless of the truth or falsity of the evidence elicited
to sustain the charge. At the same time, for the court to accredit
'surprise' to the district attorney in the undisputed attending circumstances was to accept pretense for reality and make a sham of
the requisite for the exercise of the privilege of cross-examining
one's own witness. What the district attorney intentionally and
deliberately did was to set the stage for his request to cross-examine Lofton in order to get before the jury contradictory prior
statements of the witness helpful to the prosecution. And, that
is never permissible." 3
Chief Justice Jones added: "The harm to the defendant from
the improper cross-examination is as manifest as the error of the
trial judge in allowing the district attorney to so proceed is
37
palpable.1
Chief Justice Jones then turned his powerful analysis to the
only competent evidence left on which Treetop could be convicted:
the testimony of two detectives as to what they claimed they overheard Treetop tell his alleged confederate Johnson in a cell before
he "confessed." They had never reported this important "break"
in a murder investigation to their superior officers or mentioned it
in their first trial testimony. With the cutting edge of a sur35.
36.
37.

Id. at 249, 133 A.2d at 191.
Id. at 252-53, 133 A.2d at 193.
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geon's scalpel, the Chief Justice laid bare the contradictions in this
very testimony in the different trials. He continued: "The point
which we have sought to develop up to now is not that the testimony of O'Mahoney and Thompson concerning the alleged conversation between Johnson and Turner in the cell in City Hall on June
6th is so unworthy of belief as to be rejected as a matter of law
but that it is inherently so unreliable as not to justify a finding
beyond a reasonable doubt that the conversation did actually occur
as O'Mahoney and Thompson have testified.
"We come then to the final and most important consideration
of all. Assuming, for present purposes, that Johnson and Turner,
when in the cell on June 6th, said them, still the words lack the
specification necessary to constitute them a definite and complete
admission of guilt of a particular homicide committed at a particular place."3 8
The opinion concluded: "It is, of course, the bounden duty of
peace officers to ferret out crime and prosecute offenders vigorously, and it is likewise the duty of the courts to enforce the law
faithfully and fairly. But, verdicts of guilty are not to be obtained
nor penalties inflicted on evidence incapable of proving the accused's guilt beyond a reasonable doubt. The evidence in this case
was patently far from sufficient to justify the jury's verdict.
"The judgment of sentence is reversed and a new trial granted
with directions that, if the Commonwealth is not able to produce
evidence of defendant's guilt by testimony of any greater legal
sufficiency than what it offered at the trial here involved, a nolle
prosequi be entered on the indictment." 9
The district attorney did nol. pros. the indictment and Treetop
Turner, more than eleven years after his arrest on June 3, 1946, saw
for the first time the sunlight of freedom. It should not be overlooked that this opinion of Chief Justice Jones would never have
been written but for the dedicated advocacy of Edwin P. Rome,
Treetop's lawyer from the beginning by court appointment. When
he was one of my favorite law students I foresaw that the legal
profession would come to know him as a conscientious, able lawyer. He poured thousands of hours of time into this case over
eleven years, experienced darkness, despair, sleepless nights and
eventual freedom for his impecunious client. His total fees paid
by the Commonwealth were $1,700. It was advocacy in the grand
manner, in the finest tradition of the ideal British Barrister.
Justice Musmanno was thoroughly justified in saying in his concurring opinion "I cannot help but express a renewed and continuing admiration for lawyers who, despite rebuffs and seeming failure, carry on, in the tribunals set up by the genius and fairness of
the American people, in the search for the priceless jewel of
38.
9.

Id. at 264-65, 133 A.2d at 199.
Id. at 206-67, 133 A.2d at 200,
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truth."40
In the companion Lofton contempt case, 41 Chief Justice Jones
turned his guns on another injustice. He said: "And, as had been
conclusively forecast, Lofton refused to testify to the effect which
the district attorney strove to get him to do, and the trial judge
twice held him in contempt for his refusal. This happened at the
morning session of Turner's trial on February 19, 1954. The next
day the trial terminated with the jury's verdict finding Turner
guilty of murder in the first degree with penalty fixed at life
imprisonment. It was not until August 22, 1956, however, that the
trial judge called Lofton before him for sentence for the adjudged
contempts. Lofton being unrepresented by counsel, the court requested Edwin P. Rome, Esq. (then present for the sentencing of
his client, Turner) to represent Lofton in respect of his being sentenced for contempt. Rome promptly assumed the responsibility.
The court thereupon'imposed sentence on Lofton for the contempts
whereof he had been adjudged guilty two and one-half years before. In support of its action, the court, approximately three
months later, filed an opinion which, to say the least, it is difficult
to correlate with what had actually transpired at the Turner trial
while Lofton was on the witness stand. Lofton's appointed counsel duly appealed to this court the judgment of sentence for contempt which the court below had imposed.
"In holding Lofton for contempt at the trial, the court gave as
its sole reason, for so doing the witness's refusal to answer questions.

The record makes this plain beyond quibble.

42

He quoted

the record. In his opinion sur contempt the trial judge said "It was
not the fact that the witness desired not to testify. That had nothing to do with it. It was the manner in which he showed contempt
for counsel and for the Court, and for the institution of the
Court." Chief Justice Jones retorted: "If Lofton's conduct at the
Turner trial was as bad as the opinion for the court now tries to
make it appear to have been, it merited condign punishment
promptly imposed, i.e., immediately after the jury in the Turner
case had returned its verdict and had been discharged. For the
court to wait two and one-half years to punish for a contempt
committed in its presence which it terms 'flagrant' and of such
'reprehensible nature' as to shock the court, 'most completely'
serves neither to vindicate the majesty of the law nor to uphold
the dignity of the court."4a
The sentence for contempt was vacated. This case has always
puzzled me. I have had trial experience before the trial judge
who was so strongly criticized in this opinion and I found him to be
able, conscientious and thoroughly fair.
40.
41.
42.
43.
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In 1955 a bare majority of the Supreme Court extended the
"felony-murder doctrine" and held that a co-felon can be found
guilty of murder where the victim of an armed robbery justifiably
kills the other felon as both felons flee from the scene of the
crime. 44 The decision shocked legal scholars and some of my
friends of the British Bench and Bar could not believe such an
appellate decision could exist. Fortunately, it soon received, with
one dissent, the interment it deserved; twenty-eight months after
its unfortunate birth, it was overruled 45and Justice Arnold joined
in expressly overruling his own opinion.
Chief Justice Jones opened one of his best opinions with this:
"The defendant was convicted of murder in the first degree with
penalty fixed at life imprisonment for the death of his co-felon
from a gunshot wound inflicted by a police officer endeavoring to
apprehend the two culprits who were attempting to flee the scene
of their armed robbery. From the judgment of sentence entered
on the jury's verdict, the defendant has appealed contending that
he cannot, under any rational legal theory, be charged with murder
for his accomplice's death since the killing was done by an officer
of the law engaged in the performance of his duty and was,
therefore, a justifiable homicide. Opposed to this, the Commonwealth maintains that the defendant is not only chargeable with
murder for his confederate's death under the rationale of Commonwealth v. Thomas,.. . but also, on the ruling in Commonwealth v.
Almeida,. .. the proofs being that the defendant initiated and profrom a policevoked the fusillade of shots one of which, admittedly
'46
man's gun, mortally wounded the co-felon.
After analyzing Thomas, Chief Justice Jones continued: "The
decision in the Almeida case was a radical departure from common
law criminal jurisprudence; and the ruling should not be extended by still further judicial enlargement. A review of relevant
authorities will so confirm.
"The only constitutional power competent to define crimes and
prescribe punishments therefor is the legislature, and courts do
well to leave the promulgation of police regulations to the people's
chosen legislative representatives. No killing under circumstances
such as the instant case presents had ever before been declared
murder in this State prior to the ruling in Commonwealth v.
Thomas, supra. If predominant present-day thinking should deem
44. Commonwealth v. Thomas, 392 Pa. 639, 117 A.2d 204 (1955). Justices Jones and Musmanno filed separate dissenting opinions, and Justice
Chidsey joined in the former which commenced "I am at a loss to understand how anyone can be found guilty of murder at common law for a
killing that, unquestionably, was a justifiable homicide. Yet, that is preprecisely the eventuality which the court's decision in this case portends."
This is a particularly brilliant dissenting opinion.
45. Commonwealth v. Redline, 391 Pa. 486, 137 A.2d 472 (1958).
46. Id. at 488-89, 137 A,2d at 473.
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it necessary to the public's safety and security that felons be made
chargeable with murder for all deaths occurring in and about the
perpetration of their felonies-regardless of how or by whom such
fatalities came-the legislature should be looked to for competent
to that end which
exercise of the State's sovereign police power
47
has never yet been legislatively ordained."
The opinion then goes into a complete accurate review of the
felony-murder theory in English and American law which inevitably leads to the overruling of Thomas and casts grave doubt upon
how much longer Almeida (a case in which Justice Jones dissented) can survive. Which is all to the good.
Just as his dissenting opinion in Thomas exposed the anemic
nature of its rule, so too, did Justice Jones's opinion in Commonwealth v. De Pofi4 s drive a coffin nail into the shocking practice
which the Supreme Court had sanctioned in 1928, of permitting

the Commonwealth to introduce in a murder case, the defendant's
criminal record for the theoretically sole purpose of enabling the
jury to fix the proper penalty, in the event it found the defendant
guilty and adjudged the guilt to be first degree murder. Whenever
I read a judge's charge on the theoretically restricted use of such
evidence I thought of the famous New Yorker magazine cartoon of
the judge saying "Strike that out of the record" and the juror saying to himself "You won't strike it out of my record."
Justice Jones said in De Pofi: "Thereafter, and until the Act
of 1947, supra, we had a situation in this State with respect to prior
offense evidence, so made admissible against a defendant in a homicide case, that amounted to little less than a fanciful illusion. A
jury was supposed to keep separate in its 'adjudicating' mind the
evidence it heard as to the defendant's guilt and, in its 'penaltyfixing' mind, the evidence as to the defendant's prior unrelated
criminal offenses. The thing could, and no doubt has, actually
worked out in practice in a truly shocking way. It is not beyond
the range of possibility that where, upon a trial for murder, the
defendant's guilt is doubtful under the evidence, the balance may
be tilted in favor of a conviction because of the subconscious effect
of the impression made on the minds of the jury by the evidence
of the defendant's prior criminal record.149 This pungent and accurate statement helped bring about, although it required another
decade, the "split-verdict" Act of December 1, 1959, P.L. 1621.
Just two weeks before he retired Chief Justice Jones had the satis47.
48.

Id. at 489-90, 137 A.2d at 473-74.
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held unconstitutional for vagueness the Act of July 3, 1947, P.L. 1239, which

purported to amend the Act of March 15, 1911, P.L. 20, and bar evidence of
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711 (1964).
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faction of construing this Act in Commonwealth v. McCoy5" and
of laying down the "Split-Verdict Act Hearing Rules" for the guidance of all the common pleas judges of the Commonwealth in future
murder trials. It will always be difficult for me to understand
how able, fair-minded judges could ever have announced a rule so
repugnant to any realistic concept of due process and fair play;
and, having created such a dreadful rule allowed it to operate unchecked until the Legislature gave it its long overdue coup de grace
thirty-one years later.
PROTECTING LAWYERS FROM JUDGES

The refusal of Justice Jones to pull his punches no matter who
was getting hit shows up clearly in opinions dealing with what he
believed was reprehensible conduct by common pleas judges. In
the Levine Contempt Case5 ' it appeared that on Friday, November
30, 1951 President Judge W. Walter Braham of Lawrence County
sent three messages to District Attorney Sherman K. Levine to
come to Judge Braham's courtroom and each time got a reply that
Levine was engaged in Judge Lamoree's courtroom and would appear as soon as he could. Almost eight weeks later, (following a
50. 405 Pa. 23, 172 A.2d 795 (1961). See 19 P.S. § 4701.
51. 372 Pa. 612, 95 A.2d 222 (1953). The facts and holdings are summarized in the syllabus: "In an appeal from an adjudication holding the
district attorney guilty of contempt, in which it appeared that on Friday,
November 30, 1951, the district attorney and his assistant were delayed,
by reason of their engagements in another courtroom, in responding to
the president judge's message to report to his courtroom; that when the
district attorney did appear a colloquy occurred between him and the
president judge; that on the following Monday the president judge summoned the district attorney to his chambers and gave him the choice to
appear in court for a public rebuke or be cited for contempt, and the
district attorney wrote a letter refusing to submit to public reproof; that
the president judge then issued a show cause rule and held a hearing two
weeks later at which he refused to disqualify himself; that five weeks
later the president judge filed an ajudication in which he found the district attorney guilty of three acts of contempt (i.e., (1) insulting and contemptuous denunciation of the president judge in open court on November
30 (based upon the judge's finding, from his own recollection, but unsupported by any testimony in the record, that the district attorney had said,
'That's the way with this court, always mixing things up; everything is set
for one day'), (2) his failure, upon reasonable request, to provide the president judge's courtroom with the assistant of a district attorney, and (3)
his writing of an insulting letter to the president judge), but did not sentence the district attorney upon the third act, it was Held that (1) the
district attorney's remark 'That's the way with this court, always mixing
things up; everything is set for one day' was contemptuous; (2) the president judge erred in holding the second act to be a contempt; (3) certain
statements in the letter were an inexcusable affront; (4) the refusal of the
president judge to disqualify himself was within his discretion; (5) the
contempt proceeding was summary in nature, and did not lose its character as such by the delay in reaching an adjudication; and (6) the decree
should be affirmed insofar as it adjudged the district attorney guilty of
contempt for his statement in open court."
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show cause contempt hearing on December 17th at which Judge
Braham presided and also examined his six witnesses on direct
examination and cross-examined the district attorney's eleven witnesses) he filed an adjudication finding that on the unhappy Friday
in November when the district attorney finally appeared in court
he said "That's the way with this court, always mixing things up;
everything is set for one day." The district attorney was fined
$100 for contempt, and the Supreme Court affirmed on the sole
ground that the district attorney made this statement.
The twenty page dissenting opinion of Justice Jones is a painstaking analysis of the record and the law. He emphasized that
this language was not charged in the judge's specification of charges
appended to the show cause rule "and was not testified to at the
hearing by any witness; '52 "And, although the district attorney
literally begged Judge Braham to tell him what he had said that
was contemptuous, the Judge failed to enlighten him."53 As to
Judge Braham's statement in his adjudication that "the evidence of
the Court Crier corroborates the President Judge as to the statements made", Justice Jones said "It does nothing of the sort" and
quoted the testimony to prove his point. 54 He continued: "The
necessity for a hearing was manifest. But the hearing which the
Judge conducted proved to be illusory. Summary procedure not
having been availed of, it was not permissible for the Judge to
make findings from his own memory, unsupported by any testimony
adduced at the hearing. It is therein that the fundamental error
of this court's affirmance also lies. The majority mistakenly attribute to a judge, upon the trial of a contempt, the right, which
attends only a summary proceeding, to act upon his own recollection without testimony. The majority opinion fails to recognize
that where 'the issuance of process and the holding of hearings' is
resorted to, the incidents of a summary proceeding do not attend." 55
Answering Judge Braham's complaint that the district attorney
was demanding the right to fix the court sessions, Justice Jones
retorted: "Even if he did, there was a more appropriate way for
the court to settle that with dignity and effect. A contempt proceeding, especially one summarily conducted, should not be used
vanity over a
to vent a judge's anger or to placate his ruffled
'56
supposed invasion of the prerogatives of his office.
Justice Jones believed the district attorney had been convicted
of contempt without due process of law. In the beginning of his
opinion he emphasized the importance of the case to the Bar: "In
my opinion Judge Braham acted captiously and ill-advisedly. The
litigation which he initiated is now before us for review. I have,
52.
53.
54.
55.
56.
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therefore, no alternative but to express my differing views. The
principle involved is of highest importance. A conscience-free and
judicially untrammeled bar is as essential to the proper functioning
of our judicial system as are judges themselves. The issue far
transcends the personalities of the parties immediately con57
cerned."
On May 28, 1959 Chief Justice Jones, acting for the Court,
issued a special writ of certiorari to stop President Judge James C.
McCready of Carbon County from any further attacks upon a
respectable and reputable member of the Bar, with whom I have
been pleasantly associated in a number of trials. The judge's conduct in signing warrants for the arrest of the attorney and his client, in unlawfully holding them in criminal contempt of court without a requested preliminary hearing as required by statute, in
directing the district attorney to submit bills of indictment to the
grand jury, in rejecting a petition for a writ of habeas corpus and
in refusing to hear motions to quash warrants of arrest was so
arbitrary and extraordinary as to seem to be incredible. It is all set
forth in the opinion of Chief Justice Jones, filed on July 2, 1959 in
Commonwealth v. Hoffman. 58 Chief Justice Jones held that the
commitment on a charge of criminal contempt "was void and of no
legal effect."5 9 On the separate question as to whether the attorney
had been contemptuous the Chief Justice said that all he did "was
done within his rights as legal counsel for the Hoffmans. His answer and amended answer to the Commonwealth's petition for a
writ of possession were respectful and properly done, as the record
shows. When the court decided against him, he took an appeal to
this court as he had a right to do; and when we, on January 7, 1959,
refused his application for a supersedeas on the appeal, the Commonwealth was immediately given possession of the land with the
assistance of Hoffman and the appeal withdrawn. All of this happened within a week of the court's order awarding the Commonwealth a writ of possession. Why, three months after everything
had been settled, an affidavit was taken from Gossler in order to
file a petition
for contempt against Philip and Hoffman, is yet in' 60
explicable.

Chief Justice Jones never forgot that a free and fearless Bar is
absolutely essential in any government in which "The Rule of Law"
prevails, and that without such a Bar "The Rule of Law" cannot
prevail. He had no time for people who run around shouting
"Communist" and deprive citizens of their Constitutional rights.
This appears repeatedly in his opinions and is etched with clarity
in one of his last group of opinions filed on July 18, 1961. Any list
of this judge's most important opinions must include Schlesinger
57.
58.
59.
60.
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Appea 61 in which the Court reversed the disbarment of an attorney who had been actively practicing since 1927. In 1950, when the
Communist Party was a legally recognized political party in Pennsylvania, the Committee on Offenses of the Court of Common Pleas
of Allegheny County charged the attorney with "professional misconduct", the principal charge being that he had violated his oath
as attorney by being a member of the Communist Party. This
culminated in an order of disbarment on May 10, 1960. In the
opinion of the Court, Chief Justice Jones held that (1) the proceeding against the appellant before the Committee on Offenses, in
which the functions of prosecutor, judge and jury were combined
in one body, deprived the appellant of the "fair" hearing to which
due process of law entitled him, and the proceeding was legally
incapable of supporting the order of disbarment entered by the
court below, solely on the basis of the committee's report and recommendation; (2) the testimony of the committee's witnesses was
insufficient as a matter of law, to convict the appellant of professional misconduct; and (3) the order of disbarment should be reversed and the complaint dismissed. There were numerous other
specific holdings including "There is not a word in this record that
the appellant ever advocated the overthrow of the government by
the use of force and violence. '" 2 The Chief Justice's detailed
analysis of the record is devastating in its effectiveness. Chief Justice Jones said: "The right to practice law is constitutionally protected as a property right and no attorney can lawfully be deprived
of such right except by due process of law and upon competent and
relevant proofs sufficiently credible to support a just order of disbarment.
"In Schlesinger Petition, 367 Pa. 476, 481, 81 A.2d 316 (1951)
we had occasion to declare that the right to practice law is a right
so valuable that it '"may neither be extinguished, abated nor dismissed by any proceeding short of one which fully comports with
the historical and constitutional requisites of due process."'
"The record in the instant case plainly discloses that the appellant was deprived of his constitutional right to practice his profession by the order of disbarment entered by the court below as the
result of a proceeding which manifestly violated the requirements
of due process in that the respondent was not afforded the full,
fair and impartial hearing to which he was entitled." 63
This thirty-four page opinion which analyzes every aspect of
the case and each of the rulings on evidence deserves thoughtful
study in its entirety. When one realizes that when he was working
on the preparation of this opinion it was very difficult for Chief
Justice Jones to read and probably most of the record was read
61.
62.
63.

404 Pa. 584, 172 A.2d 835 (1961).
Id. at 609, 172 A.2d at 846.
Id. at 596-97, 172 A.2d at 840.
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aloud to him, one grasps his wonderful facility of storing facts in
his mind, classifying them, and bringing them forth in a skillfully
organized and clear opinion.
THE "COMMUNIST" TEACHER CASES

During the early 1950s the Philadelphia Board of Public Education was greatly concerned about communist teachers in the public schools and was busily engaged in tracking them down and
getting rid of them. The Board was faced with the teachers tenure
act 64 which specifically listed the only grounds on which a teacher's
contract of employment could be terminated, one being "incompetency". A 1949 amendment 5 had added "advocation of or participation in unAmerican or subversive doctrines" but this had been
specifically repealed by the Loyalty Act of December 22, 1951 P.L.
1726, 65 P.S. § 211. That Act made subversive public employes, including public school teachers, subject to dismissal by the appointing authority but only after investigation, notice, hearing and proof
"by a fair preponderance of the evidence" that the employe was "a
subversive person". The Philadelphia Board of Public Education
adopted the practice about 1952 of having teachers called in before
the Superintendent of Schools and questioned concerning their loyalty and association with Communist organizations. When they refused to answer they were charged with "incompetency", found to
be guilty solely on that ground, in the face of a record of years of
"satisfactory" teacher ratings, and dismissed. Other teachers were
dismissed as "incompetent" solely because they claimed their constitutional privilege not to testify before a congressional committee.
In Board of Public Education v. Beilan6 6 the Supreme Court upheld
a dismissal for "incompetency" because of refusal to answer the superintendent's questions about his loyalty by a teacher who during
every one of his twenty-three years of teaching had received a
"satisfactory" rating. In one of his most famous dissenting opinions
Justice Jones asked: "How then, did the School Board come to disregard the procedure prescribed by the Loyalty Act for investigating and acting upon the case of a teacher suspected of disloyalty.
By the simple expedient of professing that the Board's inquisition
had nothing whatsoever to do with Beilan's 'loyalty or disloyalty'.
The Board avows that it dismissed him for 'incompetency' under
the Public School Code for his refusal toanswer a question by the
Superintendent of Schools on two occasions (June and October,
1952) as to whether he had been press director of the professional
section of the Communist Political Association eight years before
and for his refusal to answer questions of similar nature by counsel
64. Act of May 18, 1911, P.L. 309 § 1208 as amended by the Act of
June 20, 1939, P.L. 482.
65. Act of March 10, 1949, P.L. 30, § 1122. This is the Public School
Code of 1949, § 1122, 24 P.S. § 11-1122.
386 Pa. 92, 125 A.2d 327 (1956), alf'd 357 U.S. 399 (1958).
46.
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for a subcommittee of the Un-American Activities Committee of
'
the House of Representatives on November 18, 1953."67
Justice
Jones said: "The hearing which the Board conducted into Beilan's
refusal to answer the Superintendent's one question and the questions of the Un-American Activities Committee was a loyalty proceeding from beginning to end; and it is rather disingenuous for
anyone to suggest otherwise. If it was not a loyalty proceeding,
it was nothing other than a brutum fulmen except for the seriousness of its determination which this court now enthrones as finality.
The Superintendent of Schools testified that when Beilan came to
his office, pursuant to summons, the Superintendent told him that
he had information that bore on the question of Beilan's loyalty
and that he wanted to know about it. And, the State Superintendent of Public Instruction, in his opinion dismissing Beilan's
appeal from the Board's action, made a formal finding that the
local Superintendent had informed Beilan that he 'wished to ask
him some questions having an important bearing on his loyalty.'
"One would have to be naive indeed to be able to say truthfully that he did not believe that Beilan's refusal to answer the
array of stigmatizing questions asked him by counsel for the UnAmerican Activities Committee (on counsel's say-so that the Committee had 'sworn testimony' to support the implications of the
questions) had not produced in the minds of the Board members
an implied confession by Beilan of his guilt. Such was the practical
effect of the procedure and made of the Board's hearing an inquiry
into Beilan's loyalty-a proceeding possible in Pennsylvania only
under the Loyalty Act." 8 Justice Jones referred to William Bradford's colloquy with the Pennsylvania Colonial Governor in 1689
and his statement "Let me know my accusers, and I shall know the
better how to make my defence." He continued: "We have, indeed,
come a long way since 1689. But, one may well wonder at times
in just what direction so far as respect for the constitutional rights
of the individual is concerned. Here is a case of a long-time public
school teacher, entitled by statute to tenure, who is deprived of
his professional status and livelihood because he pleaded the Fifth
Amendment in refusing to answer questions of a congressional
committee, touching his loyalty. He has never yet been confronted
by his accusers or given an opportunity to cross-examine them.
If it be said, by way of a paraphrase of Mr. Justice Holmes' oft67.
68.

386 Pa. at 101, 125 A.2d at 335-36.
Id. at 106, 125 A.2d at 338. Court of Common Pleas No. 6, con-

sisting of Bok, P. J., Flood and Levinthal, JJ (probably the strongest com-

mon pleas court in the Commonwealth) had reached the same conclusion.

Mr. Justice Bell, in his separate dissenting opinion said:

We cannot shut our eyes to the inescapable fact which we are
convinced-notwithstanding the earnest, able argument of counsel
for the Board [C. Brewster Rhoads, Esq.]-is glaringly disclosed
by this Record, that Beilan was fired because the Board believed
that he was a Communist.
386 Pa. at 110, 125 A.2d at 340.
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repeated epigram, that no one has a constitutional right to be a
school teacher, still one does not surrender his constitutional rights
by becoming a public school teacher."6 9
The next group of cases reached the Supreme Court in 1960
and involved dismissals for "incompetency" based solely on the
teacher's refusal to answer questions before the Velde Committee
of the House of Representatives! 0 This time the views of Chief
Justice Jones prevailed and the teachers were ordered reinstated.
Writing the opinion of the Court he said: "But, the Board presently
advances the idea that a teacher who refuses to answer a Congressional Committee's questions, implying possible subversive affiliations on the part of the witness, is incompetent within the meaning
of the tenure provisions of our Public School Code. Such a contention transgresses what was thought to have been decided in
Beilan, where we were assured that no question of loyalty was in
any way involved. If the refusal to answer a particular question is
to be made a basis for the discharge of a professional employee,
the question should, obviously, have for its purposes the eliciting
of information concerning some matter material to the fitness of
the employee to continue at work. This is so whether the question
propounded be by a Congressional Committee or by the Board
of Education itself. And, if the only material matter to which the
question relates is possible disloyalty or subversion on the part of
the employee, then any proceeding looking to his dismissal for refusal to answer questions relating to his possible disloyal or subversive activities or affiliations must be brought under the Pennsylvania Loyalty Act of December 22, 1951, P.L. 1726, 65 PS §211
et seq. .

.

. What the Board of Education has attempted to do in

these cases is to avoid the requirement of the Pennsylvania Loyalty
Act that disloyalty or subversion, as a ground for the discharge of
a public school teacher, must be proven 'by a fair preponderance
of the evidence.' The Board's action evidences a belief that it has
found a way to dismiss, without any evidence at all, teachers whom
it suspects of disloyalty or subversion. Anything in the Beilan
case to the contrary is herewith overruled for the future."'"
ZONING PROBLEMS
Following World War II, the tremendous increase in residential
and industrial construction, and the rapid increase of population
in many areas, particularly suburban areas, created many head69. 386 Pa. at 109, 125 A.2d at 339-40.
70. Board of Public Education v. Intille, 401 Pa. 1, 163 A.2d 420 (1960),
Board of Public Education v. Watson, 401 Pa. 62, 163 A.2d 60 (1960).
71. 401 Pa. at 22-23, 163 A.2d at 430-31. But after Chief Justice Jones
retired from the Court, Beilan was resurrected in Board of Public Education
v. Soler, 406 Pa. 168, 176 A.2d 653 (1961), and Chief Justice Bell said at
page 176, 176 A.2d at 657: "We disavow such dicta [in Intille] and limit
the opinion . . . to the questions which were there involved."
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aches for a host of municipal officials. They needed a lot of discretionary power and flexibility with respect to zoning ordinances
in order to control, and direct an orderly growth of communities
and to preserve and increase pleasant residential neighborhoods of
various types. But in the early 1950s several opinions were filed
in the Supreme Court of Pennsylvania which contained language
which strongly emphasized a person's right to do anything he
pleased with his property within well known traditional limits and
strongly emphasized that zoning ordinances must be strictly construed as derogating from this right.72 For a time it looked like
really effective zoning would become very difficult, at least, in
Pennsylvania. Then in 1958 Chief Justice Jones got the Court back
on the right track in Bilbar Construction Co. v. Easttown Township
Board of Adjustment.73 This very important case had an unusual
history. The property owner sought a building permit to erect a
residence dwelling (as part of the development of a fifty acre tract)
on a lot containing 21,000 square feet and a frontage of one hundred feet. This was refused because in that residential area the
zoning ordinance required a minimum lot area of 43,560 square
feet (an acre) and a minimum frontage of 150 feet. The property
owner attacked the zoning ordinance as arbitrary and unconstitutional. The case was first argued in the Supreme Court on June 5,
1957 and on June 28th the Supreme Court in an unanimous opinion held the ordinance was unconstitutional as applied to the property in question. On October 10, 1957 (the day after Best was
orally argued) the Supreme Court granted a reargument in Bilbar and the case was reargued orally on November 18, 1957.
Seven important law firms filed briefs as counsel for parties,
72. E.g., Rolling Green Golf Club Case, 374 Pa. 450, 97 A.2d 523 (1953)
(in which Justice Jones noted his dissent) and Medinger Appeal, 377 Pa.
217, 104 A.2d 118 (1954). In Medinger a unanimous Court struck down as
unconstitutional a zoning ordinance which created different districts and
prescribed a different requirement as to minimum habitable floor area in
each district. For two-story houses this varied from minimum requirements of 1800 square feet in an AA district to 1000 square feet in a D
district. A property owner in an AA district wanted to erect a residence
containing only 1125 square feet of habitable floor area. The Court said:
We therefore hold that neither aesthetic reasons nor the conservation of property values or the stabilization of economic values
in a township are, singly or combined, sufficient to promote the
health or the morals or the safety or the general welfare of the
township or its inhabitants or property owners, within the meaning
of the enabling Act of 1931, as amended, or under the Constitution
of Pennsylvania ....

This ordinance flies in the face of our birth-

right of Liberty and our American Way of Life, and is interdicted
by the Constitution."
377 Pa. at 226, 104 A.2d at 122.
73. 393 Pa. 62, 141 A.2d 851 (1958). On the same day the Court decided Best v. Zoning Board of Adjustment, 393 Pa. 106, 141 A.2d 606 (1958),
in which Justice Cohen wrote the opinion of the Court. Both cases were
4 to 3 decisions with Justice (now Chief Justice) Bell, and Justices Musmanno and Benjamin R. Jones dissenting.
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intervenors, and amici curiae, and six senior members of the
Bar presented oral arguments to the Supreme Court. On May
2, 1958 the Court withdrew its previous opinion, vacated its
previous order, and in the opinion of Chief Justice Jones held that
the ordinance was constitutional. He said: "what serves the public
interest is primarily a question for the appropriate legislative body
in a given situation to ponder and decide. And, so long as it acts
within its constitutional power to legislate in the premises, courts
do well not to intrude their independent ideas as to the wisdom of
the particular legislation. Specifically, with respect to zoning enactments, judges should not substitute their individual views for
those of the legislators as to whether the means employed are likely
to serve the public health, safety, morals or general welfare.
"Although some of our recent cases appear to have ignored
'general welfare' as a consideration in adjudging whether the police
power has been constitutionally exercised in a given instance, it is
not open to serious question that it is one of the important elements
to be reckoned with in any such inquiry. Its importance lies partly
in the fact that it admits of aesthetic considerations when passing
upon the validity of a zoning ordinance. As long ago as Kerr's
Appeal, .

.

. this court recognized that 'while a zoning ordinance

cannot be sustained merely on aesthetic ground, that may be considered in connection with questions of general welfare.' Since,
with the passing of time, urban and suburban planning has become
an accredited adjunct of municipal government, aesthetic consideraas sustions have progressively become more and more persuasive
74
taining reasons for the exercise of the police power.
Municipal officers and solicitors read this language, breathed
a sigh of relief, and went on with the business of solving the particular problems of their particular communities and planning in a
comprehensive way for future growth. So far, Chief Justice Jones's
statesmanlike opinion has withstood various attempts to get it overruled. Its future impregnability seems to have been strengthened
by the very recent decision in National Land and Investment Co.
v. Easttown Township Board of Adjustment15 which involved the
same zoning ordinance as in Bilbar, pointed out that Bilbar had
upheld the constitutionality of the ordinance's one acre requirement, and cited that decision with approval. There had been a
1962 amendment to this ordinance creating a four acre minimum
lot size requirement. The Court said that no minimum acreage
requirement is unconstitutional per se, but held, in the circumstances of this case, that the four acre minimum was unconstitutional as applied to the particular appellants' property. The fact
that the beneficent influence of Chief Justice Jones still guides the
Court along the proper path in this enormously important field of
zoning law is clearly seen in another statesmanlike opinion by
74.
75.

393 Pa. at 72-73, 141 A.2d at 856-57.
419 Pa. 504, 215 A.2d 597 (1965).
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Justice Roberts in this 1965 decision involving the same ordinance,
in which he said: "In the span of years since 1926 when zoning
received its judicial blessing, the art and science of land planning
has grown increasingly complex and sophisticated. The days are
fast disappearing when the judiciary can look at a zoning ordinance
and, with nearly as much confidence as a professional zoning expert, decide upon the merits of a zoning plan and its contribution
to the health, safety, morals or general welfare of the community.
This Court has become increasingly aware that it is neither a
super board of adjustment nor a planning commission of last resort. . . . Instead, the Court acts as a judicial overseer, drawing
the limits beyond which the local regulation may not go, but loathing to interfere, within those limits, with the discretion of local
governing bodies. . . . The zoning power is one of the tools of
government which, in order to be effective, must not be subjected
to judicial interference unless clearly necessary. For this reason, a
presumption of validity attaches to a zoning ordinance which imposes the burden to prove its invalidity upon the one who challenges it."76
LrmITING THE GOVERNOR'S REMOVAL POWER
Justice and Chief Justice Jones wrote particularly important
opinions of the Court construing the limitations on the Governor's
power to remove Gubernatorial appointees pursuant to Article VI,
§4 of the Constitution. In Watson v. Pennsylvania Turnpike Commission77 the Court held, as stated in the syllabus: "1. In view of
the provisions of the Act of May 21, 1937, P.L. 774, §4, concerning
the tenure of the appointed members of the Pennsylvania Turnpike
Commission, the Governor of the Commonwealth does not have
power under Article Vr, §4 of the State Constitution (which provides that 'Appointed officers, other than judges of the courts of
record and the Superintendent of Public Instruction, may be removed at the pleasure of the power by which they shall have been
appointed') to remove from office, at his pleasure, a member of
the Pennsylvania Turnpike Commission during a fixed term of office for which he was appointed and confirmed.
The following syllabus paragraphs are taken from the language
of Justice Jones:
"2. Under Article XII, §1, of the State Constitution (which
provides that 'All officers whose selection is not provided for in
this Constitution, shall be elected or appointed as may be directed
by law. . . .') where the legislature creates a public office, it may
impose such terms and limitations with reference to the tenure or
removal of an incumbent as it sees fit.
76. Id. at 521-22, 215 A.2d at 606-07. It seems to me that the cases
cited in footnote 72, supra, can no longer be considered authoritative on

their statement of the limited scope of zoning power.
77.

386 Pa. 117, 125 A,2d 354 (1956).
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The constitutional provisions for the removal of elected

or appointed officers are exclusive and prohibitory of any other
method, which the legislature may deem better, only where the office is a constitutional one.
"4. Where the legislature, in creating a public office, imposes
no terms or limitations on the duration of an incumbent's tenure or
the mode of his removal, the method of removal prescribed by
Article VI, §4 of the Constitution, applies.
"5. The question whether the tenure or removal of an appointee of a legislatively created office has been so conditioned by
the legislature as to exempt the incumbent from removal by the
Governor at his pleasure, under his constitutional power, is one of
intent to be gleaned from the statute creating or regulating the of-

fice."
This case was followed by Bowers v. Pennsylvania Labor Relations Board78 in which the Court held, as stated in the syllabus:
"1. In view of the provisions of the Act of June 1, 1937, P.L. 1168,
§4(a) concerning the tenure of the appointed members of the
Pennsylvania Labor Relations Board, the Governor of the Commonwealth does not have power under Article VI, §4, of the State
Constitution (which provides that 'Appointed officers, other than
judges of the courts of record and the Superintendent of Public
Instruction, may be removed at the pleasure of the power by which
they shall have been appointed') to remove from office, at his
pleasure, a member of the Pennsylvania Labor Relations Board during a fixed term of office for which he was appointed and confirmed." This opinion announced these rules of statutory construction: "3. Whether the legislature in creating an appointive office
has evidenced by its enactment an intention that the tenure of the
appointee shall not be subject to termination at the pleasure of
the appointing power presents a pure question of statutory construction which is peculiarly and exclusively the function of the
judiciary to resolve.
"4. The legislature has shown that, when it creates an administrative agency and provides that its members shall be appointed
for fixed terms with staggered expiration dates, the intent thereby
evidenced is that such members are not removable by the appointor
at his pleasure."
A particularly interesting part of this opinion is the "nondecisional" expression by Chief Justice Jones of his views on the Govvernor's lack of power to remove without cause an appointee to an
administrative board or commission which, as authorized by law,
is invested with judicial powers and duties and who cannot be
78. 402 Pa. 542, 167 A.2d 480 (1961). This is a 4 to 3 decision with
three separate dissenting opinions. The law in this field is not yet settled.
See Schluraff v. Rzymek, 417 Pa. 144, 208 A.2d 239 (1965), which is another
4-3 decision.
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independent if he holds his office only during the "pleasure" of
another. 9
LIMITING PUBLIC UTILITY COMMISSION'S POWER

In 1943 the Yellow Cab Company of Philadelphia induced the
Legislature to enact and the Governor to sign the Act of June 5,
1943, P.L. 901, which required procurement of a certificate of public
convenience from the Public Utility Commission by one desiring
to engage in the business of renting motor vehicles without drivers,
and which prescribed the filing of tariffs and other requisites for
the issuance of such a certificate. One of the Hertz companies
challenged the constitutionality of this statute in the Commonwealth Court which upheld the Act and dismissed the suit. This
brought forth, in his fourth year on the Supreme Court, a brilliant
opinion on important questions of constitutional law, by Mr. Justice
Jones, speaking for a unanimous Court. In Hertz Drivurself Stations, Inc. v. Siggins ° he wrote "we declare the Act to be null and
void, and, therefore unenforceable."'" The Act, it was held, violated Article I, sections 1 and 9, and Article III, section 7 of the
Constitution of Pennsylvania and the due process clause of the
fourteenth amendment.
After sketching in the background, Justice Jones said: "The
present problem, therefore, at once invites an inquiry into (1)
whether the business which the Act attempts to subject to legislative control and regulation is affected with a public interest and,
(2) if it is, then is the Act a valid and proper exercise of the police
power in the public interest?
"Unfortunately, there is no hard and fast rule for determining
arbitrarily and conclusively when a business or property is affected
with a public interest. That deficiency has been recurrently recognized in the reported decisions of a number of jurisdictions. But,
fundamentally, it still remains essential to constitutional regulation
and control of private property that the subject property be affected
with a public interest and that a legislative exercise of the police
power in such regard be in the public interest. And, while the
tests applied are not completely exhaustive in all instances of the
existence of such interest, there are certain norms which are
helpful in determining whether a business is so 'affected'." 2
After analyzing the decisions of the Supreme Court of the
United States, he continued: "It is beyond dispute that the present
appellant's business possesses no governmentally conferred exclusive privilege or franchise. Neither does it enjoy a circumstantially
created monopoly either 'practically' or 'virtually'. Its property is
79.
80.
81.

402 Pa. at 552-58, 167 A.2d at 484-87.
359 Pa. 25, 58 A.2d 464 (1948).
Id. at 51, 58 A.2d at 478.

82. Id. at 34, 58 A.2d at 470.
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not devoted to public use nor has the public acquired an interest
therein. The appellant does not lease its motor vehicles to the
public indiscriminately. Its customers are selected, as the learned
chancellor found and the court en banc confirmed. Indeed, as the
findings and the record disclose, in a given period it actually refused a relatively substantial number of lease applications which
it had found unsatisfactory according to its own prescribed standards. There is no peculiarly close relationship between the public
and the appellant's business; and there are no implications that
the public has a right to expect that the leasing service will be
available at all times to anyone demanding it. The business of
leasing motor vehicles without drivers is just as private as the business of selling automobiles 8 3whether the latter be by the manufacturers or by sales agents.1
He added: "What this Act attempts to regulate and control is
a private business and it does that simply in the interest of common or contract carriers'8 4 by motor vehicles and not for any discernible public purpose.
Answering the argument that the Act could be sustained under
the Commonwealth's power to regulate the use of its highways,
Justice Jones said: "It is not constitutionally permissible for the
legislature, on the pretense of regulating the use of highways, to
regulate in fact the user's private business which is unaffected
with a public interest."' 5
When I reported this opinion I realized that Justice Jones's
five years of seasoning as a Federal circuit judge, frequently studying constitutional questions, had enhanced his great value to the
Supreme Court of Pennsylvania.
LIMITING HosPITAL's

PowER

TO DISMISS

PHYsicmAN

When the board of directors of a hospital dismisses a medical
doctor from the staff it is an extremely serious matter to the board
and also to the doctor. When the doctor is a surgeon or an obstetrician and cannot obtain staff privileges in another hospital the result
is completely devastating to his professional career. As the former
president of a metropolitan general hospital, I also know how important it is for a board of directors to be able to get rid of an
unsatisfactory staff member. Chief Justice Jones came to grips
with some aspects of this problem in Berberian v. Lancaster Osteopathic Hospital Association.86 The facts and the decision are
stated in the first paragraph of the syllabus, as follows: "1. In
this action in equity in which it appeared that the board of direc83. Id. at 39, 58 A.2d at 472.
84. Id. at 41, 58 A.2d at 473.
85. Id. at 46, 58 A.2d at 476.
86. 395 Pa. 257, 149 A.2d 456 (1959). I had the privilege of arguing
the appeal as counsel for the doctor who was appellant.
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tors of a private hospital dismissed a member of the medical staff
without notice of the charges against him and without a hearing,
and it appeared that although the by-laws of the corporation provided that 'The directors may deprive any member of the staff,
any physician or any surgeon from the privileges of the hospital',
the directors subsequently approved staff by-laws which provided
the procedural safeguards of an adequate hearing, before the executive committee of the staff could recommend the suspension or
dismissal of any member of the general staff, it was Held that
(1) when the board of directors approved the staff by-laws, they
became an integral part of the contractual relation between the
hospital and the members of its staff; (2) the dismissal of the
plaintiff without giving him notice of the charges against him and
without a hearing was unlawful; and (3) an injunction should issue
restraining the defendants from depriving the plaintiff of staff or
other hospital privileges or facilities of the defendant corporation
except after a hearing duly had with a right of appeal in the
plaintiff as provided for in the by-laws of the hospital's staff."
In accordance with his invariable practice, Chief Justice Jones carefully reviewed this syllabus and approved it before its publication.
He referred to the rules announced in other states, and the distinctions which have been drawn between private and public hospitals.
His language is summarized in the syllabus: "4. As a general rule,
the board of directors of a private hospital association may, at its
own discretion, remove a physician from its staff; but a public
hospital must give notice and hearing before a member of its
staff may be removed."
EMINENT DOMAIN POWERS OF THE COMMONWEALTH
87
In Fidelity-PhiladelphiaTrust Company v. Commonwealth,
in one of his earliest opinions Justice Jones ruled that in an eminent
domain case the Commonwealth is required to pay damages for
delay in payment. The Department of Justice refused to accept
this as good law which led to Justice Jones pointing out in Gitlin
v. Pennsylvania Turnpike Commission88 that any other rule would
palpably violate Article I, section 10 of the Constitution of Pennsylvania. That settled that. Gitlin, together with Rosenblatt v.
Pennsylvania Turnpike Commission, 9 state a number of very important rules concerning the time when a taking by the Pennsylvania Turnpike Commission occurs, when there are separate takings
of different parcels of the same owner, the date for reckoning the
damages for subsequent appropriations and the time when the landowner must object to an additional appropriation. In Ewalt v.

87. 352 Pa. 143, 42 A.2d 585 (1945).
88. 384 Pa. 326, 121 A.2d 79 (1956).
89. 398 Pa. 111, 157 A.2d 182 (1959). This case is very complicated
and contains a fifteen page concurring and dissenting opinion by Justice
Bell and a fifteen page dissenting opinion by Justice McBride.
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PennsylvaniaTurnpike Commission0 the constitutional validity of
section 6(k) of the Western Pennsylvania Turnpike Extension Act
of 1941 was announced and the Turnpike Commission held to be
liable as a continuing trespasser for consequential damages to land.
FRAUD AND DECEIT-THE DECEPTIVE HALF-TRUTH
The 1947 opinion in Neuman v. Corn Exchange National Bank
and Trust Company9' is noteworthy in several respects. It is an
important analysis of the tort law of fraud and deceit which
adopted several sections of the Restatement of Torts and applied
them to quite unusual facts. It illustrates how Justice Jones
brushed aside all sophistry and went straight to the heart of the
case. It shows his courage in not pulling his punches in branding
a large, highly respected Philadelphia bank as a willful fraud-feasor
even though a prestigious law firm had advised it in the transaction.
The facts are stated in footnote 91 but more detail is needed here.
The bank was executor of Stein's estate who died in 1943 owning
approximately one-quarter of the stock of a whiskey blending company and some warehouse certificates for 1000 barrels of bourbon
whisky which had an O.P.A. ceiling price of $53,963.79 and an actual
value far in excess of the legally permissible sales price. The bank
sold the certificates to one Schweidel, a disbarred lawyer, for the
ceiling price, under an agreement which also required him to
offer $45,000 for the stock, subject to Neuman and Laden's prior
option right to purchase the stock. The bank then wrote to Neuman "we wish to advise you that we have entered into a contract
of sale with I. H. Schweidel ... [for the decedent's stock] for the
sum of $45,000, which will be consummated unless you and Mr.
Laden, or either of you, arrange to acquire the said stock at that
90. 382 Pa. 529, 115 A.2d 729 (1955).
91. 356 Pa. 442, 51 A.2d 759 (1947). The facts and holdings are summarized in the syllabus: "In an action for deceit, in which it appeared that
plaintiff had an option to buy certain shares of corporate stock for the
same price the defendant could obtain from any other person; that the defendant informed plaintiff it had received an offer of $45,000 from a named
third person for the stock, without disclosing that said offer was conditioned on purchasing certain whiskey certificates from defendant at the
O.P.A. ceiling price which was far less than their actual value; that the
actual value of the stock alone was no more than $27,000 and that no bona
fide offer for the stock alone would have exceeded that figure; that the
plaintiff, who was one of the four shareholders of the corporation and who
was anxious not to have the offeror become a shareholder, realizing he was
paying an excessive price, bought the stock for $45,000 in reliance on defendant's representation; and that plaintiff subsequently discovered that
the $45,000 offer was a required "tie-in" to the purchase of the whiskey
certificates and not a bona fide offer for the stock alone; it was HELD that
(1) all the elements of a cause of action for deceit were present, and
(2) the loss to the plaintiff was the difference between the price which
he was deceptively induced to pay for the stock and the bona fide price
which a third person would have offered for the stock alone, which loss
the jury properly determined to be $18,000."
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price." Neuman, the plaintiff, valued the stock at $20,000, but the
idea of having this disbarred lawyer getting into the same corporate
bed with him with a 25% stock ownership, led him to exercise his
option and buy the stock for $45,000. The bank successfully argued to the court below that Neuman could not be, and was not,
deceived as to the value of the stock in a company in which he
already owned a 25% interest. Justice Jones answered this argument: "Of course, one cannot be deceived as to the value of stock
concerning whose intrinsic worth he is fully informed. But, such a
one can readily be deceived as to the price offered by a third person for stock if the owner or holder thereof avows as the offer an
inflated price intended to cover additional valuable considerations
secretly contemplated by the prospective seller and the outside offeror. .

.

. The cause of action in suit is the defendant's wrong in

inducing the plaintiff by misrepresentation to pay considerably
more for the stock than the amount of any bona fide offer for the
'9 2
stock which the defendant had from Schweidel or anyone else.
After discussing the "tie-in" aspects of Schweidel's offer, Justice Jones said: "In failing to tell Neuman that Schweidel's offer
for the stock was an essential complement of his opportunity to
acquire the whiskey certificates, the bank was guilty of a material
misrepresentation. The deliberate nondisclosure of a material fact
amounts to culpable misrepresentation no less than does an intentional affirmation of a material falsity: see Restatement, Torts,
§529, comment a., and §551; cf. also Croyle v. Moses, 90 Pa. 250,
252. The misrepresentation, whereof the plaintiff complains, did
not relate to the value of the Haller stock, as the court below mistakenly conceived. It consisted of the deceptive factual understanding induced in Neuman's mind through the bank's failure to
inform him concerning the complete terms of Schweidel's integrated
offers for the whiskey and the stock. In substantial effect, Schweidel's offer of $45,000 was for the stock and the right to purchase
the whiskey at its ceiling price, i.e., for actually less than the whiskey's well-known pecuniary value."93
The argument that Neuman could not "justifiably rely" on the
bank's statement was answered with: "There was no reason for
Neuman to suspect that the sale of something in addition to the
stock was tied to the offer and, particularly, not a scarce and much
sought-after commodity which, being subject to O.P.A. regulations,
could not legally be a constituent subject of a 'tie-in' sales agreement. .

.

. The rectitude of the bank's action was, therefore, all

the more to be presumed in the circumstances,-a situation which
the bank's subsequent attitude tended to confirm. '94
Brushing aside the contention that there were no provable
92.
93.

356 Pa. at 449, 51 A.2d at 763.
Id. at 451, 51 A.2d at 764.

94. Id. at 453, 51 A.2d at 765.
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damages, Justice Jones said: "While formulated rules relating to
the appropriate measure of damage in varying circumstances have
to some extent become fixed, they are by no means immutable
but bend to the exigencies of the particular case in order that just
compensation may be ascertained and awarded."9 5
In an unusual one paragraph supplemental "Per curiam"
opinion, Justice Jones denied an unusual petition for reargument.9 6
FIDUCIARY DUTY OF LIABILITY INSURER

In recent years there has been an important development in
decisional law concerning the fiduciary duty a liability insurer owes
to its insured. The case comes up as follows: The plaintiff, who
is injured in a collision with the insured's vehicle sues the insured
for damages. Under the standard provision of the liability policy,
the insurer takes complete control of defending the action and
settling the claim. The policy limit is $10,000 and the plaintiff
offers to settle for $9,999 which the insurer refuses. Subsequently
a judgment is entered against the insured for $25,000. May the
insurer be held liable for the entire $25,000 despite the $10,000
policy limit, and if so, under what circumstances? Chief Justice
Jones announced the common law of Pennsylvania on this important question in Cowden v. Aetna Casualty and Surety Company,9 7
in which he said: "The basic question of law raised by this appeal
relates to the nature and extent of the duty owed to an insured
by his insurer against liability for personal injury to others
where the insured, by the terms of the policy, cedes to the insurer
the right to control litigation (falling within the insurance coverage) including possible settlement of the claim against the insured
when it is apparent that a recovery, if adversarily obtained, will
exceed the maximum limit of the insurer's liability under the policy.
"This precise question has never before been passed upon by
this court, but, fortunately, there is no occasion for any controversy as to the applicable rule. It is established by the greatly
preponderant weight of authority in this country that an insurer
against public liability for personal injury may be liable for the entire amount of a judgment secured by a third party against the
insured, regardless of any limitation in the policy, if the insurer's
handling of the claim, including a failure to accept a proffered
settlement, was done in such a matter as to evidence bad faith on
the part of the insurer in the discharge of its contractual duty."98
The syllabus states these rules of law, which are quoted from
the opinion, as follows: "2. An insurer against public liability for
personal injury may be liable for the entire amount of a judgment
95. Id. at 457, 51 A.2d at 766.
96. Id. at 459, 51 A.2d at 767-68.
97. 389 Pa. 459, 134 A.2d 223 (1957).
98. Id. at 468, 134 A.2d at 227.
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secured by a third party against the insured, regardless of any
limitation in the policy, if the insurer's handling of the claim,
including a failure to accept a proffered settlement, was done in
such a manner as to evidence bad faith on the part of the insurer
in the discharge of its contractual duty.
"3. When a liability insurer voluntarily undertakes the defense of its insured in pursuance of its privilege under the policy,
it assumes a position of trust and confidence which calls for the
exercise of the utmost good faith, particularly in view of the possible conflict of interest between the insurer and the insured which
may develop.
"4. While a liability insurance policy constitutes a contract
which is primarily one of indemnity, it operates at the same time
to create an agency relationship in its provision for the insurer's
exercise of control over the disposition of claims against the insured (within the poliiy's limits) whether that be by settlement or
litigation.
"5. Where there is little or no likelihood of a verdict or even a
settlement within the limits of the policy's coverage, the insurer
must act with the utmost good faith toward the insured in disposing of claims against the latter.
"6. The duty of the liability insurer is to consider in good
faith the interest of the insured as a factor in coming to a decision
as to whether to settle or litigate a claim against the insured.
"7. When there is little possibility of a verdict or settlement
within the limits of the policy, the decision to expose the insured
to personal pecuniary loss must be based on a bona fide belief by
the liability insurer, predicated upon all of the circumstances of
the case, that it has a good possibility of winning the suit.
"8. Good faith by the liability insurer requires that the chance
of a finding of nonliability be real and substantial and that the
decision to litigate be made honestly.
"9. A liability insurer's bad faith in refusing to settle a claim
for the policy limit or less must be proven by clear and convincing
evidence and not merely insinuated."
In this case the Court held that the evidence was insufficient
to 99prove the insurer's bad faith and affirmed judgment n.o.v. for
it.
99. This law has recently been further developed in Gedeon v. State

Farm Mut. Automobile Ins. Co., 410 Pa. 55, 188 A.2d 320 (1963), and in
Gray v. Nationwide Mut. Ins. Co., 422 Pa. 500, 223 A.2d 8 (1966), and these
additional points are now settled law: 1. It is not necessary for the insured
to allege that he has paid or will pay a judgment in excess of the policy
limits in an action against the insurer for breach of its duty to act in good
faith. 2. The insured's cause of action against his insurer is in assumpsit
and is assignable; and it may be assigned.to the plaintiff who has obtained
a judgment against the insured for an amount in excess of the policy

limits.
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ABANDONMENT AND ADOPTION

The humanity of Justice Jones is etched in his opinion in the
Ashton Adoption Case.00 Such cases, as this one did, generally
involve unwed mothers and illegitimate children. The child had
been taken from the mother (who never saw it) at birth. The
mother relinquished her child with great reluctance. Seven months
later she was served with a petition for adoption which she opposed
with all the power she could summon. Justice Jones said: "It
is readily apparent from a reading of the material facts that there
is bound to be tragedy in this case no matter what the ultimate
decision is. The petitioners, who have acted in good faith and
have done nothing improper in furthering their desire to adopt another child, have no doubt developed a deep affection for the baby
whose care and nurture have been their responsibility for the two
years since its birth. Nor are the doctor's motives to be questioned.
He undoubtedly acted in what he thought was for the best interest of both the natural mother and the child. There is no reason
not to accept at face value his answer to the question, 'In doing
what you did, Doctor, did you feel that you were acting for the
best interests of the child', which was as follows: 'I most certainly
do. I thought that as I did previously state, that I felt that I was
making not only both Elaine [the mother] happy and also the Kubachs happy. And, r certainly felt that it was in the best interests
of the child.' On the other hand, the sincerity and depth of the
mother's desire for her child is equally not open to question. It
represents an expression of perhaps the strongest natural instinct
known to man which is especially encouraged by and has become
highly developed in our civilization. Solomon's sage solution of the
celebrated contest of the two women over a child, which each
claimed as her own, was reasoned on the basis of the self-sacrificing love for the child exhibited by the natural mother when both
claimants were simultaneously put to the same test. For answer
to the problem in this case, our recourse must be to the written
law applicable to the circumstances."''1 1
The legal problem was whether the mother had "abandoned"
her child for a period of more than six months in which event,
under the Adoption Act of 1925, as amended, her consent to the
adoption was not required. Judge Holland, in the Orphans' Court
of Montgomery County, concluded that the necessary abandonment
had been established and entered a decree of adoption. Justice
Jones disagreed. While "abandonment" is a fact it is an inference
from other basic facts and the Supreme Court has the power to
review the evidence and reach its own conclusion about this controlling fact after reviewing the record. Justice Jones said: "The
evidence is wholly insufficient to support a finding of abandonment
100.

374 Pa. 185, 97 A.2d 368 (1953).

101.

Id. at 194-95, 97 A.2d at 373.
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from either intent or conduct on the part of the mother.
"In reality, the circumstances of the case did not admit of
abandonment by the mother at any time. She never had possession of the child from the moment of its birth and, consequently
had no opportunity to evidence by her conduct, with an alternate
choice before her, a settled purpose to forego all parental duties
and relinquish all parental claim to the child. No case in this
State has been cited, as we know of none, where there has been
abandonment by a mother who did not have actual possession of
the child at some time or ready access to it, and being so situated,
exhibited, by her conduct, an intent to be relieved of her parental
responsibility for which she was willing to surrender her claim to
the child. While proven abandonment renders unnecessary the
abandoning parent's consent to adoption of a child,
the two things
10 2
are not synonymous and are not to be confused.'
On the separate issue of custody, in which the controlling
question is always one of the child's own welfare, Justice Jones
said that although the persons who had the child and sought to
adopt it could "give the child more material comforts and advantages" that fact "is neither a legally nor socially valid reason for
separating children from their parents."' 03 I suspect that Justice
Jones's grandchildren adored him.
GIRARD COLLEGE TRUSTEESHIP'

4

In the Girard Will Case'0 5 Justice Jones and three other members of the Court joined in the opinion of the scholarly Chief
Justice Horace Stern which held that the clear intent expressed in
the will of Stephen Girard prohibited the admission of Negro boys
to the orphanage and school known as Girard College, and that the
present public policy of the Commonwealth does not bar carrying
out Girard's intent. Chief Justice Stern said that if the Board of
Directors of City Trusts, by reason of the Fourteenth Amendment,
"cannot carry out a provision of Girard's will in regard to the beneficiaries of the charity as prescribed by him, the law is clear that
the remedy is, not to change that provision, which, as an individual,
he had a perfect right to prescribe, but for the Orphans' Court,
which has final jurisdiction over the trust which he created, to
appoint another trustee."'1 6 After the Supreme Court of the United States subsequently held, in reviewing this decision, that the
Board of City Trusts is a State agency which is barred by the
Fourteenth Amendment from any racial discrimination, 10 7 the Or102.
103.
104.
105.
106.
107.

(1957).

Id. at 197-98, 97 A.2d at 374-75.
Id. at 200-01, 97 A.2d at 376.
391 Pa. 434, 138 A.2d 844 (1958).
386 Pa. 548, 127 A.2d 287 (1956).
Id. at 566, 127 A.2d at 295.
Commonwealth v. Board of Directors of City Trusts, 353 U.S. 230
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phans' Court of Philadelphia County did remove the Board as
trustee and substituted thirteen private citizens as trustees of the
Girard Estate. The case came back to the Supreme Court of Pennsylvania on various appeals from these decrees. Chief Justice
Jones wrote the opinion of the Court which affirmed the decrees
of the Orphans' Court. With his characteristic quality of going
straight to the one critical point, and brushing aside all the emotionfilled arguments, Chief Justice Jones said: "The appellants' effort
to make a 'segregation' issue out of Stephen Girard's private charity, merely because of the inability of the Board of City Trusts, as
trustee, to comply with the donor's express directions, serves only
to confuse and obscure the real issue involved as to the right of a
private individual to bequeath his property for a lawful charitable
use and have his testamentary disposition judicially respected and
enforced. .

.

. The exercise of that right is but one of the mani-

festations of the right of private property which is fundamental to
our social, economic and political order and whose preservation
unimpaired is as vital to our Negro citizens as it is to their white
brethren."'0 8
Answering one of the appellants' arguments he said: "There is
nothing in the testator's will or in any legislation by the Commonwealth or the City that serves to make Girard College a public
charity or that requires that it be publicly administered. On the
contrary, we hold, on the basis of the compelling testamentary
evidence, already noted, that Girard College is a private charity
capable of being lawfully administered by private trustees."'u 9
Answering another argument, Chief Justice Jones said: "The
Orphans' Court did not act to exclude Negroes from Girard College.
None had ever been admitted. What the Orphans' Court did was
to refuse to admit the Negro applicants because they did not qualify for admission under the terms of Girard's will. And, to speak
of Girard College as remaining 'segregated' as a result of the Orphans' Court action is to use a term whose present-day stigmatizing connotation has no proper place in this case."' 10
It is important to point out that the so-called "Public Accommodations Act""' was cited in the briefs for the appellants in the
1956 argument of the first appeal, in which Chief Justice Horace
Stern wrote the opinion; and was again cited in the briefs for appellants in the second appeal in which Chief Justice Jones wrote
the opinion.
In addition, just the year before the first appeal was argued in
the Supreme Court, the Court specifically considered the scope and
108. 391 Pa. at 441, 138 A.2d at 847.
109. Id. at 447, 138 A.2d at 849.
110. Id. at 456, 138 A.2d at 853-54.
111. Act of June 11, 1935, P.L. 297, which was reenacted as § 564 of
The Penal Code of 1939, P.L. 872, 18 P.S. § 4654.
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proper construction of this very statute in Everett v. Harron.1 12
Chief Justice Stern wrote the opinion, in which he quoted the
statute in full and carefully analyzed it. Justice Jones joined in
the opinion. They were reminded not only of the statute but also
of their construction of it by references in the briefs to the very
recent opinion of Chief Justice Stern construing its scope.
On September 2, 1966, United States District Court Judge Joseph S. Lord 3rd, in a one judge decision, ruled that this Public
Accommodations Act clearly applies to Girard College and that it
prohibits the trustees of the Girard Estate from excluding Negro
orphan boys from Girard College."13 Judge Lord ordered the
trustees to admit Negro orphan boys to Girard College although
this is precisely what Chief Justice Stern held in 1956, and Chief
Justice Jones told them again in 1958, they must not do. So Judge
Lord has decided that these two Chief Justices, and all the concurring justices, ordered the Girard trustees to violate The Penal
Code and pursue a course of continuing criminal misconduct, punishable by imprisonment. There is necessarily implicit in Judge
Lord's opinion the thought that every one of the seven justices of
the Supreme Court who participated in the two appeals, and particularly the two distinguished Chief Justices who wrote the two
opinions of the Court, ignored a controlling statute which was
pointed out to them in the briefs, and were completely ignorant
of its meaning, effect, and controlling application (although they
had carefully considered it in 1955) in disposing of the appeals before the Supreme Court in 1956 and 1958. I consider Judge Lord's
opinion to be an affront to the memory of Chief Justice Charles
Alvin Jones and also to Chief Justice Horace Stern. It is incredible
that either one of these unusually thorough and painstakingly
careful scholarly judges could have overlooked and failed to consider a statute they had so recently considered and which was cited
in the brief they were studying. It is utterly inconceivable that
both of them could have overlooked this statute. It was cited a
second time to Chief Justice Jones in the briefs he studied in the
second appeal before he wrote his opinion. Having studied literally hundreds of opinions of each of these Chief Justices the inference, to me, from their not mentioning in either one of their opinions the statute they had recently construed in Everett is clear:
"The Public Accommodations Act of 1935 is so clearly inapplicable
to Girard College that it would be a work of superogation to say
anything about it in the Court's opinion. We know, of course,
that public policy is announced by the Legislature in statutes (subject to constitutional limitations) and the Court must consider any
statute counsel cites in determining the present public policy of
the Commonwealth. But rules concerning opinion writing do not
112.
113.

1966).

380 Pa. 123, 110 A.2d 383 (1955).
Commonwealth v. Brown, 260 F. Supp. 323, 339-40 (E.D. Pa.
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require any reference to a cited statute which has been examined
by the Court, considered, and found to be clearly inapplicable to
the case under consideration."
THE ENING

This article must come to an end. I am uncomfortably aware
of the fact that there are many important opinions I have not mentioned. I hope that I have succeeded in presenting a representative
sampling of the more important opinions (out of a total number exceeding 600) of an able and dedicated judge who will always be
one of my judicial heroes.

